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The Efficacy of Merit Review of Common Stock
Offerings: Do Regulators Know
More than the Market?
Marianne M. Jennings*
October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to
speculate stocks in. The others are July, January, September,
April, November, May, March, June, December, August and
February.
Pudd'nhead Wilson
Mark Twain, 1898
I.

INTRODUCTION

As long as there has been greed, there have been financial
schemes and frauds created to capitalize on the greed in all of
us and to fulfill the greed of their sponsors. 1 The desire to
enjoy a high rate of return is part of a sophisticated investor's
strategy and the driving force behind the inexperienced,
smaller investor's decision to venture into higher risk securities
purchases. Government regulation has attempted to create a
level playing field for all investors through various means of
scrutinizing proposed sales of securities. 2

* Professor, Department of Business Administration, College of Business,
Arizona State University. A project as complex as one that forms the basis of this
article requires much assistance and cooperation. The author appreciates the work
of Sheila Bond, April Kasl, Allison Bond Jones, Stephanie Bond Phair, Janette
Kasl and Tim West who gathered and assimilated the data on securities
registrations. The author also appreciates the legal research assistance provided by
Laurel Wala and David Gass.
1.
While not all stocks or exchanges have been plagued with fraud, schemes,
and greed, they have facilitated many investor losses for some time. As early as
the late 1700s, there were commodity exchanges on Wall Street. The New York
Stock Exchange was formally organized in 1R27. See J. Baer & 0. Saxon,
Commodities Exchanges and Futures Trading, Principles and Operating Methods
(1949).

2.

It has been noted:
In a world with . . . no mandatory disclosure system, firms could
remain silent with impunity. If they disclosed, they would do so in any
way they wished . . . [t]hey could attempt to sell securities with ads in
glossy magazines and on television featuring sexy models or herds of
bulls, as sellers of other products (including brokerage services) do.
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At the federal level, Congress created a system for pre-sale
registration and approval for proposed offerings through the
Federal Securities Act of 1933. 3 The federal registration
process is one of disclosure. Based on the rationale that a full
disclosure of the firm's past events serves some value to
investors in making their investment decisions, the federal
registration process seeks to ensure that investment decisions
may be based on full information. 4
Even so, that federal "full information" or "full and fair"
disclosure standard was insufficient for many state regulators
since full disclosure does not preclude fraudulent or high risk
offerings. 5 Many states thus enacted securities regulations
that required an examination of the merits of the proposed
securities offerings. 6 These blue-sky laws 7 were enacted in

A mandatory disclosure system substantially limits firms' ability to
remain silent. Just as importantly, it controls the time, place and manner
of disclosure. Firms must wait until they file a registration statement
before saying anything that may be construed as touting (the "gun
jumping" rule); they must wait until the registration statement is effective
and a prospectus has been delivered before putting anything else in
writing (the "free writing" rule); they must mail prospectuses and proxy
statements at designated items but not resort to ads on television.
What does a mandatory disclosure system add to the prohibition of
fraud? The implicit public-interest justification for disclosure rules is that
markets produce "too little" information.
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680-81 (1984).
3.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a - 77aa (1989).
4.
Some dispute the theory that full disclosure is helpful in a regulatory sense
since under the "efficient market hypothesis" it is maintained that all existing
information about an offering is reflected in the price of the securities and any
detailed disclosure of past performance is simply historical and of little value in
predicting future securities performance. See, e.g., George J. Benston, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of
19.'34, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); James S. Mofsky & Robert T. Tollison,
Demerit in Merit Regulation, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 367, 368 (1977); See also, Eugene
F. Fama, et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT'L
ECON. REV. 1 (1969).
5.
Although many states incorporate full disclosure standards, their regulation
goes beyond that, to the merits. Both 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1988) and Section 18 of the
Securities Act of 1933 authorize such separate regulation to wit: "Nothing in this
subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency
or office performing like functions) of any state or territory of the United States, or
the District of Columbia, over any security or any person."
6.
Kansas was the first state to enact securities laws (1911). By 1913 there
were twenty-three states with some form of securities law. See, LoUIS Loss &
EDWARD M. COWE'IT, BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 (1958). For a more complete historical
perspective, see, ld. Most of the state regulatory schemes were merit-based; see
Ernest W. Walker & Beverly B. Hadaway, Merit Standards Revisited: An Empirical
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response to the 1907 panic. They permitted state regulators to
require additional information and to review the offerings on
the basis of various standards of evaluation. 8
The wisdom of merit regulation has been much questioned
and debated. Issues raised in the ongoing debates are (1)
whether merit statutes impede firms' ability to raise capital;
and (2) in view of the costs of the often extensive filings and
reviews in merit states, whether merit review provides any
additional information not already available and analyzed by
the market. 9
Several studies of offerings filed in merit
review states have been conducted by evaluating the financial
performance of the firms seeking approval in such states. 10
Both the studies' data and the financial analyses have been
criticized for various omissions and methodologies.n
The research in this article evaluates the efficacy of
Arizona's merit review standards in light of criticisms of
previous studies. 12 Even though the full impact of these merit
standards cannot be determined, 13 this article focuses on the

Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651, 651-52 (1982).
7.
"Blue sky laws" refers to state laws regulating the sale and registration of
securities. The term originated in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) in
which the Court described fraudulent securities as "speculative schemes which have
no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'." Id. at 550.
8.
Those standards of evaluation are discussed infra at pp. 10-19 and notes
19-46.
9.
For a discussion of costs see, JAMES S. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON
NEW BUSINESS PROMOTIONS at 31 (1971). See also, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note
4, at 367-368.
10.
See, e.g., Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit
Requirements, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 79 (Wisconsin study); Ernest W. Walker &
Beverly B. Hadaway, supra note 6 (Texas). Contra, Hugh H. Makens, Who Speaks
{or the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on Merit Regulation, 13 BALTIMORE
L. REV. 435 (1984). The Goodkind study is criticized by James Mofsky and Robert
Tollison in Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 4, at 369. For a review of the types of
merit regulation and discussion of regulatory and business concerns see, Report on
State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 Bus. LAW. 7R5 (1986).
11.
Mofsky & Tollison, supra, note 4, at 371. Makens, supra, note 10, at 45556.
12.
Elaboration regarding those criticisms is found infra, part III.
13.
For example, it is impossible to determine what types of firms are
effectively precluded from the registration process because of cost and complexity;
or what firms choose not to register in Arizona because of its strict merit
standards. Mofsky & Tollison note:
We do not know how many new firms fail to come into existence because of
the blue sky laws. Nor do we know the number of offerings not made in
some states but made in others where the merit standards are less
intolerable. That information is obviously critical in assessing the costs of
state securities regulation.

214

B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law

[Volume 7

post-registration financial performance of firms registering
offerings in Arizona during the years 1984 - 1987. Those
performing the study examined both approved and withdrawn
offerings. 14 The results appear in Parts IV and V after Parts
II and III, respectively, present an examination of merit review
regulation and previous studies.
II.

MERIT REVIEW STATUTES-TYPES AND SCOPE

Recent reforms by the SEC of small and private offerings
have served to reduce the impact of state merit statutes on
raising capital since those rules are largely the result of state
regulators working with the SEC and Congress to establish a
more universal exemption system for securities registration.
Regulation D 15 is perhaps the strongest evidence of a spirit of
cooperation in making federal and state standards more
uniform. 16 However, even given the parallels of some state
statutes with Regulation D, there remain twenty-five states
that recognize only some of Regulation D's exemptions. 17 State

Mofsky & Tollison supra, note 4, at 369.
14.
Although the Securities Division (hereinafter "Division") of the Arizona
Corporation Commission has the authority to deny a securities registration, no
such denials were found. The common practice seems to be the firm's withdrawal
of the offering upon significant objection by the Division or upon requests for
additional information. Some withdrawals result when the Division remains
unsatisfied with explanations and information, and the parties reach an impasse.
15.
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (1992).
16.
Regulation D resulted from congressional directives in the Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(3)(c)(1989))* which was the Congressional response to
demands for uniformity and simplicity in the registration and sale of securities at
state and federal levels and the authorization in the Omnibus Small Business
Capital Formation Act of 1980 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)-(c)(1989))* which
permitted the SEC:
To cooperate with any association composed of duly constituted
representatives of state governments whose primary assignment is the
regulation of securities business within those states for the development
of a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be
agreed upon among several states or between the States and the Federal
Government.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(c)(1) and (c)(3).
Twenty states now recognize Regulation D exemptions as state exemptions.
17.
The following state laws have exemptions compatible with Parts 505 and
506 of Regulation D: ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.240 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441844 (1987 & Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-113.(2)(0) (1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36-490(b)(9)(A),(B) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18, § 5108, Rule 9 (b)(9)(11) (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-9 (Harrison 1990); IDAHO
CODE § 30-1435, Rule 27 (1983 & Supp. 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(o) (1988
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securities laws remain a potpourri of regulation with varying
standards, requirements and exemptions. 18 However, states

& Supp. 1991), KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 81-5-6 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:709
(West 19R7 & Supp. 1990); MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 11-602, Rule 15
(1985 & Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 402(b)(a)(c) (West 1990);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 4fil.803.7 (West 1989) (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.776(402)
(Callaghan 1990 & Supp. 1992)); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.402, 30-54.210 (Vernon
1990); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-10-105, Rule 6.10.120 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81111 (1991 & Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-60(b) (West Supp. 1990) (as to
offerings other than real estate syndications); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 401,406
(West 1987 & Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.025 (1989); OR. ADMIN. R. Rule
815-36-fiOO (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-320 (Law. Co-op. 1987); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4R-2-103, Rule 0780-4-2-.04 (1988 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-114 (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4203a, 4204a (1984 & Supp. 1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-fi14(b)(14), Rule 503 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1992); VA. R. STATE
CORP. CoMM'N, Rule 503, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 60,439; W. VA. CODE §§ 32-3305, 15.06 (1992).
Kansas and Tennessee follow the North American Association of Securities
Administrators (NAASA), and limit their exemptions to Rule 505. Colorado and
New York regulate only intrastate offerings (whereas Regulation D exemptions
apply only if the offering is interstate). Oregon and Alaska register by
coordination-federal approval or exemption constitutes compliance with their
requirements.
The following state statutes provide exemptions based on the number of
purchasers, but the exemptions do not parallel Regulation D; hence, a special
structure would be necessary under these statues: FLA. STAT. ANN. §
517.061(11)(a)(1), Rules 3E-500.05 to .07 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121Y2, § 137.4(G) (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §
502.203(9)(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.15 sub.2(h) (West
1986 & Supp. 1992), MINN. R. 2875.0180 (1989); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 75-71-203(9),
(10) (1972 & Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.530(11)(a) (1990) (25 purchasers);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-203(d) (Purdon 1965 & Supp. 1992) (25 purchasers);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-31A-402 (1991) (25 purchasers for domestic
corporations, 5 for other issuers).
State statutes with only Rule 506 exemptions are: ALA. CoDE § 8-6-11 (1984 &
Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-504(a)(14) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991),
Interpretative Opinion, Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 10,661; CAL. CORP. CoDE §
25102(0 (West 1977 & Supp. 1992); CAUF. LOCK REG. tit. 10, Rules 260.102.12 to
.14 (1992), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 11,780A-C; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1(b)(10)
(Burns Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.410 (Baldwin 1990); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10502 (1988 & Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-17, N.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 18 r.1206 (1990 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03
(Baldwin 1989); TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 8.401 (West 1991), Rule 109.4(11),
3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II fi5,554; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 21.20.320 (West
1989); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 460-44A-501-503, fi06 (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
551.23(10) (West 1988).
The other states (Hawaii, Wyoming, North Dakota, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, and Rhode Island) have peculiar exemption requirements.
Ten jurisdictions (Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, D.C., Indiana, New York, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Washington) recognize Rule 504 exemptions.
18.
This "potpourri" of regulation is troubling to some in the sense that the
lack of uniformity places the United States at a distinct disadvantage in
international competition and international financial markets. See, e.g., Marianne
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with merit standards 19 maintain some common denominators

M. Jennings, Arizona C:orporation Commission v. Media Products. Inc.: Clarification
of Competinp Federal and State Securities Regulation, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449
(1989) ("the wisdom of such a piecemeal approach in a national capital market
governed by a significantly detailed federal regulatory scheme is questionable.") !d.
at 462. See also, Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Ref?ulation: Benefit to Investors
or Burden on Commerce? fi3 BROOKLYN L. REV. 105 (1987) in which the author
noted:
State merit regulation is a burden on interstate commerce and stands
as an obstacle to the achievement of the SEC's statutory goals of
facilitating capital formation and the establishment of a national market
system (NMS). Further, the basic philosophical conflict between federal
and state regulation will become increasingly troublesome as the SEC
grapples with the problems of regulating the market for corporate control
of large public companies and participating in the regulation of
international capital markets.
!d. at 107 (footnote omitted).
19.
All states regulate securities registration in some way. Thirty-nine states
have adopted or substantially adopted the Uniform Securities Act, a product of
NAASA's work with securities lawyers and legal scholars including Louis Loss as a
principal. Sel' 7B U.L.A. fi10 (198fi). The thirty-nine states (including Puerto Rico)
are as follows:
Alabama
Kentucky
North Carolina
Alaska
Maryland
Oklahoma
Arkansas
Massachusetts
Oregon
Color(ldo
Michigan
Pennsylvania
Connecticut
Minnesota
Puerto Rico
Delaware
Mississippi
South Carolina
District of Columbia
Missouri
Tennessee
Guam
Montana
Utah
Hawaii
Nebraska
Virginia
Idaho
Nevada
Washington
Indiana
New Hampshire
West Virginia
Iowa
New Jersey
Wisconsin
Kansas
New Mexico
Wyoming
For state citations to U.L.A., see Michael Newman, Municipal Securities and
StatP SecuritiPs Laws: A NPw Look, 1:~ U. BALT. L. REV. 558-59 n.::l (1984).
The following states are generally regarded as "merit" states in that some form
of merit regulation is exercised over proposed offerings:
Alabama
Kentucky
Pennsylvania
Alaska
Massachusetts
Puerto Rico
Arizona
Michigan
South Carolina
Arkansas
Minnesota
Tennessee
California
Missouri
Texas
Colorado
Nebraska
Utah
Connecticut
Nevada
Virginia
Delaware
New Hampshire
Washington
Guam
New Jersey
West Virginia
Hawaii
New Mexico
Wisconsin
Idaho
North Carolina
Wyoming
Indiana
Oklahoma
Iowa
Oregon
Kansas
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in terms of the types of factors examined in securities
registered for state approval. The following sections discuss
those common factors.

A. Uniform Securities Act Merit Standards and General Merit
Standards
Section 306(a)(2)(F) of the Uniform Securities Act incorporates merit standards as grounds for registration or denial of a
proposed offering. 20 Section 306(a)(2)(F) permits the state to
deny registration if "the offering has been or would be made
with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters'
profits or participation, or unreasonable amounts and/or kinds
of options". 21 Some states go beyond the Uniform Securities
Act standard and deny registration if the offering is not "fair,
just and equitable."22
These types of statutes afford administrators broad discretion in their reviews of offerings and also afford administrators
the latitude to develop specific topics for review. 23 Offerors
who file for registration in even these general rule states will
find themselves required to meet certain specific requirements
(discussed below) or to negotiate additional conditions for the
offering prior to the regulator's approval. In short, both the
Uniform Securities Act and the "fair, just and equitable" standards provide state administrators with broad, discretionary
review powers. 24
Merit regulators, in addition to mandating the full disclo-

States without merit regulation can review proposed offerings only for full
disclosure and fraud. Maryland and Illinois are examples of full disclosure states
which parallel the federal disclosure standards.
20.
7A U.L.A. at 621.
21.
Unif. Sec. Act § 306(a)(2)(F), 7A U.L.A. 621 (1978).
22.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1260(a)(l) (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.2R(1)(e) (West 1991).
23.
See LOUIS Loss, CoMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 84-85
(1976).
24.
It is the presence of this broad power that has been disturbing to academicians and the focus of the scholarly debate on the subject. See, e.g., Mofsky and
Tollison, supra note 4; Walker and Hadeway, supra note 6, and Goodkind, supra
note 10. Judicial challenges to merit regulation have been minimal. Wisconsin's last
reported case was Associated Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 266 N.W.
205, 209 (Wis. 1936). Arizona's most recent case, Arizona Corp. Comm. v. Media
Prods. Inc., 763 P.2d 527 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), was not a challenge to the regulations themselves but rather a challenge to the jurisdiction of state regulators
over interstate offerings.

218

B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law

[Volume 7

sure of the Federal Securities Act of 1933,25 have the authority to employ substantive standards in reviewing proposed offerings and in making decisions regarding the approval of the
offering in their states. These substantive standards are the
crux of the debate on merit review's "merits"26 and are discussed in the following sections.

B.

Capitalization Regulation

One of the substantive standards employed by merit regulators relates to the insufficiency of equity capital in relation to
the total capitalization that will exist once the offering is complete.27 Using quantitative standards (such as 10-15% of total

25.
26.

See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1988).
For example, Mofsky and Tollison, supra note 4, state:
Merit regulation has most often taken the form of rules regulating the
maximum expenses of public offerings, requiring a minimum equity investment by promoters, regulating the price that insiders must pay for
their stock relative to the proposed price for public investors; regulating
securities offering prices in relation to earnings ratios, regulating the
amount of warrants and options granted to officers, key employees and
underwriters; establishing minimal shareholder voting rights; and regulating interest and dividend coverage with respect to senior securities.
Beyond an efficient market type of criticism, merit rules have been
criticized on the grounds that seasoned firms, not subject to the rules, are
in effect granted a comparative advantage in raising capital over newly
promoted ventures. Newly promoted firms must either adjust the terms of
their offerings and their capital structures to the merit rules of particular
states or be precluded from publicly offering their securities in those
states. Some firms will thus always be at the margin where, for fmancial
and legal reasons, corporate promoters are unwilling to make the adjustment, and a decision not to offer securities in a particular state will be
made. Of course, there are a few states that do not have merit rules, and
it has been argued that a proposed offering could always be made there,
thus avoiding merit regulation altogether. But practical considerations,
relating mainly to the local nature of many small offerings, often foreclose
capital formation any place except specific areas where the firm and its
promoters are well known. There probably exists little geographic choice,
based solely on evaluation of local blue sky laws, of the place where capital can be raised.
ld. at 368-369 (footnotes omitted).
For example, Missouri requires a 15% investment for aggregate offerings up
27.
to $1,000,000 and a 10% investment in the aggregate offering after $1,000,000.
(Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.080(1) (1988)). Wisconsin has adopted NAASA's
guidelines. (WIS. ADMIN. CODE § Comm'n of Sec. 3.05 (Jan. 1992)). Texas requires
a minimum of 10% equity capital investment (TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3
(1992)). Arizona has adopted the following schedule:
10% of the first $200,000.00
5% of the second $200,000.00
1% of the balance.
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capitalization), regulators are able to set the level of risk offerors must assume in going public with the offering.

C.

Regulation of "Cheap Stock"

Often referred to as "promotional securities,"28 "cheap
stock" are securities issued to promoters and insiders at prices
significantly less than the eventual public offering price. 29 Also part of this regulation is the review of means of payment by
promoters-that is regulators are not only permitted to review
the amount of stock but the means of payment and the value of
services and tangible or intangible property given in exchange
for the shares. 30

D.

Regulation of Options and Warrants

Cheap stock regulation controls the amount of stock issued
to promoters and insiders prior to the public offering. However,
merit regulators also examine the number of options and warrants already issued or to be issued to insiders and promoters
and the relation of those numbers to the total capital structure
that will exist after the offering is complete. 31 The options and

ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § R14-4-107 (A) (Supp. 1991).
28.
Cheap stock, also called "promotional securities," is defined as:
[s]ecurities issued for services rendered, patents, copyrights or other intangibles, the value of which has not been established to the satisfaction
of the Commission by appraisals, by evidence of amounts paid by others
for substantially similar services or property, by evidence of a bona fide
offer to purchase such services or property, or by other evidence, or for a
consideration substantially less in amount than the consideration for
which such securities are proposed to be sold to the public . . . .
Mo. CODE REUS. tit. 15, § 30-52.060 (1988).
29.
See Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.070 (1988) (limits cheap stock to 50%);
WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.04 (1984) (adopts NAASA guidelines which limit cheap stock
to 60%); ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. § R14-4-105 A.2 (Supp. 1991), which
limits "promotional securities" to 15% of the outstanding securities (those that will
be outstanding at the end of the offering). Texas allows for the escrow of cheap
stock. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(5) (1992).
30.
Supra note 27, Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.060 (1988).
31.
Texas limits the number of options and warrants to 10% of the aggregate
offering price with a maximum five-year exercise period. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit 7, §
113.3(11)(1983). Wisconsin limits the number and value of warrants and options to
20% of the total number of shares that will be outstanding after the offer and 20%
of their value. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 30.03(c)(1983). ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS.
§ R-14-4-106 B (Supp. 1991) allows such options, warrants and rights to purchase
so long as:
1. A certificate or instrument in evidence thereof is issued before the
commencement of the proposed public offering.
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warrants regulation, as well as the cheap stock limitations are
designed to allow regulators to limit the amount of compensation and/or profit earned by promoters and insiders and are
nearly universally raised in the review of the proposed offering's documentation. 32

E.

Offering Price Regulation

Some state merit regulators have the authority to require
an adjustment to market price if the proposed public offering
price is too high in relation to the firm's current market price
(for seasoned offerings) or in relation to the earnings history of
those firms with no market history (unseasoned offerings). 33
This type of regulation is particularly disturbing to academicians because of its direct interference with the market place,
the efficient market hypothesis and the assignment of price
based on past performance as opposed to consideration of future market needs and changes. 34

F. Regulation of Underwriter's Commissions and I or Selling
Expenses
Excessive offering expenses, including underwriter's commissions, are items for merit review and are often subject to
negotiation. 35 These forms of regulation provide a means for

2. The number of shares covered thereby does not exceed 20% of the
number of securities to be outstanding at the completion of the proposed
public offering.
3. The initial exercise price is reasonably related to the public offering
price.
4. They do not exceed ten years in duration.
5. The prospectus to be used in connection with the proposed public offering contains a full disclosure as to the terms and reasons for their grant.
32.
See Figure 2 and Tables XI-XIII infra and accompanying text for data on
the number of option/warrant or cheap stock questions raised in the filings.
See Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.050 (1990); (limits price to 25 times
33.
the average annual net earning~ per share); WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.02(2),
3.02(1)(a) (1984) (price must be "reasonably related" and "not exceed 25 times its
average annual net earnings per share for the last 3 years"); TEX. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 7, § 113.3(2) (1992) (allows examination of price earnings ratio over the past
years).
See Mofsky and Tollison, supra note 4, at 377-378.
34.
Mo CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.040 (1990) (15% limit); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
35.
551.28CD (1988); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.01 (1973) (commissions limited to 10% and
other expenses to 15% of the aggregate offering price); ARK. REG. R. 14-4-108 (1972) provides:
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regulating any excessive indirect profits to promoters and others (as opposed to the more direct profits of "cheap stock" and
options). 36

G. Regulation of Voting Rights
Most merit states prohibit approval of offerings in which
the purchasers of the shares will have no voting rights or will
have voting rights disproportionate to those rights in previously
issued shares. 37 These types of rules serve as a control mechanism of promoters and existing shareholders so that the offering is not one used to raise capital that will be used at the
discretion of existing shareholders without the requirement of
new shareholder representation or accountability.
H.

Earnings Coverage Regulation

This form of regulation is primarily used in proposed offerings for preferred shares or debt securities. 38 Regulators examine a history of firm earnings to determine whether the
earnings are sufficient to cover interest on the proposed debt
securities or preferred dividends on the proposed equity preferred shares. 39

A. No issuer shall incur a liability which must be paid by the issuer as a
selling expense in connection with the sale of a public issuance greater
than 15% of the amount of said issue actually sold to the public.
B. Selling expenses shall include commissions, salaries, advertising and all
other expenses directly or indirectly incurred in connection with the sale of
securities . . .
36.
Some states also prohibit officers and directors from earning commissions,
see, e.g. ARIZ. COMP. ADMIN. R. & REGS. R14-4-111 (Supp. 1991); Unif. Sec. Act §
306 (2)(F) (1958) prohibits "unreasonable amounts" of commissions and selling expenses.
37.
See, e.g., Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.110 (1987) (unfair or disproportionate voting rights); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.07(a)(1)(6) (1984) (prohibits giving no
voting rights or unequal voting rights); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(6) (1992)
(prohibits "disproportionate" rights).
38.
As discussed in note 62 and accompanying text infra, these type of issues
were not included in the study and this form of regulation was not used extensively by regulators in reviewing common stock offerings except to note that the
firm currently had difficulty meeting existing preferred dividend and debt securities' payments.
39.
See, e.g. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 30, § 30-52.120 (1974) (uses a three-year test
for earnings coverage); and WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.06(1)(1984) (net earnings for last
3 years would be insufficient to cover debt interest).
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Miscellaneous Regulation

Most merit states, in addition to providing for regulation
via the previous seven specific categories, also provide regulators with a broad "miscellaneous" category for use in the review
of proposed offerings. Some factors examined in this category
include poor or unsound financial condition, the improbability
of the offeror succeeding, or unfair transactions by insiders. 40
Financial requirements and evidence of promoter experience
are mandated in some states as part of their miscellaneous
regulations. 41
This category of regulation affords administrators in merit
states broad discretion in evaluating offerings. For example, in
the present study, Arizona regulators examined issues such as
loans to officers, affiliates and shareholders, transactions between the offeror and its affiliates, and the number of offerings
made by an offeror in recent periods. 42
Also appropriately discussed here are the detailed requests
for information and corrections that comprise part of the merit
review process. For example, Arizona's routine check list for
initial review of an offering includes items such as correction of
the language for consent to service of process, 43 requests for

40.
In many states, the "miscellaneous" category is not a codified concept but a
discretionary one usually found in the form of policy statements. The policy basis
for this discretionary category can be found in 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
'II 5151-5381# (1984). NAASA has also adopted certain policies with respect to this
miscellaneous discretion. See, e.g. Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 9605 (1984), in which
Arizona adopts NAASA policies: "NAASA statements of policy. The Securities Division subscribes to the statements of policy adopted by (NAASA) relating to the registration of securities in Arizona except where in conflict with a state rule or regulation." Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 9605 (1984).
For a more detailed discussion of Arizona's discretionary review issues, see note
62 infra and accompanying text.
For other examples of state regulations, see, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 51050.33-.40 (1983), as reported in 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 25,443-25,400. Iowa
requires a promoter's investment of at least 10%; limits offering expenses to 7% of
the first $500,000 in aggregate offering price and 5% of any aggregate price above
that; employs a 3-year earning test for offering price and limits commissions to
10% and options or warrants to 20% and requires cheap stock to go into escrow
for 10 months.
41.
In Texas, real estate syndication promoters must contribute at least $50,000
to the syndicate and have at least two years executive experience in real estate.
TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 117.2(a) and (b) (1982).
42.
See text accompanying note 62 infra for details on offering reviews.
43.
Arizona Corporation Commission Form SR 000103 (copy available in offices
of BYU J. PuB. L.) lists item 5 as "The Consent to Service of Process must name
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market and underwriter information,44 requests for additional
language in the prospectus, 45 and requests for financial statements.46 In short, the broad discretionary authority can result
in a laboriously detailed review and many firms withdraw from
Arizona after receipt of the request or requests in the standard
checklist. 47
III.

PREVIOUS STUDIES OF MERIT EFFICACY

To date, there have been three quantitative studies of the
efficacy of merit review. The first such study was Goodkind's
evaluation of Wisconsin's merit system. 48 Goodkind compared
the post offering financial performance of corporate issuers
whose offerings were registered or withdrawn 49 between 1968
and 1971 in Wisconsin. 50 Goodkind's financial analysis used
price, book value and dividend distribution as the indices of
firm performance. 51 Goodkind also used a figure of a loss of
75% of the stock's market value as an indicator of business
failure, with 23.5% of the withdrawn firms found to be

all members of the Arizona Corporation Commission."
44.
Item 6 of Form SR000103 provides: "The Division requests additional information relating to the offering such as the names of the market makers, volume of
transactions, and the underwriters memorandum."
45.
Item 8 of Form SR000103 provides: "Please represent in the prospectus that
all future transactions with affiliates will be on terms no less favorable than could
be obtained from unaffiliated parties."
46.
Item 10 of Form SR000103 provides: "The Securities Division requests the
following exhibits: a. Financial statements in accordance with the requirements of
A.R.S. Section 44-1894."
47.
See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the data.
48.
Goodkind, supra note 10.
49.
Withdrawal is the fate of securities not approved by the state. No denials
are recorded by Goodkind, or in the present study, (see notes 62-64 infra) because
a firm faced with regulators unwilling to approve their offerings are able to withdraw. Many firms withdraw if significant objections are raised rather than invest
the time and effort required to address regulators' concerns. Further, a withdrawal
may result because the offering is terminated due to market conditions, changes in
the offeror's needs or underwriting difficulties. The reason for withdrawal is not
always given in every file and for the most part, is accomplished by a letter noti!Ying the regulators of withdrawal.
50.
Goodkind also provides an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of
the merit system of regulation. Goodkind, supra note 10, at 107-23. Other nonquantitative reviews of merit standards include Rutherford B. Campbell, An Open
Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. OF CoRP. L. 553 (1985) and
Jeffery T. Haughey and Kevin M. Veler, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. OF CORP. L. 689 (1982).
51.
See Table I infra.

224

B.Y.U. Journal of Public Law

[Volume 7

failures. 52 Critics have cited methodological flaws in Goodkind's study53 and have also criticized its failure to recognize
the additional consumer and societal costs of merit review. 54
Walker and Hadaway's 1982 study of Texas merit review
compared common stock offerings between 1975 and 1980. 55
Although Walker and Hadaway reached a different conclusion
than Goodkind, their study was also criticized for its narrow
focus in that partnership offerings were not examined and only
corporate issues were reviewed. 56
Jennings' and Kudla's 1983 study of Arizona's merit review
process concluded that the financial performance of withdrawn
offerings was better than the performance of registered offerings57, but was criticized for its lack of significance due to low

Goodkind, supra at note 10.
Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 4, state:
[T]he components of the study's empirical test are not designed to
shed any light on the issue it purports to investigate, namely investor
protection, even within a range of tolerable imprecision. Only one index of
performance used in the study-stock price-is relevant. The other two
indices used-dividend distribution and book value-are essentially meaningless and misleading measurements in this context.
!d. at 371.
The Wisconsin study is so methodologically flawed that it yields no
useful information on the very interesting problem it posed.
!d. at 376.
54.
Mofsky and Tollison note:
But it was not only methodology that flawed the Wisconsin study. It
was also marred by a priori acceptance that blue sky regulation does not
generate unintended costs for consumers and society generally. The study
gathered data with respect to only one matter-whether investors who
bought issues meeting Wisconsin's merit rules fared better than investors
who bought issues denied registration in Wisconsin.
!d. at 370.
(Note: Although Mofsky and Tollison use the term "denied" in their critique, Goodkind compared approved with withdrawn registrations because there were no denials).
55.
Walker and Hadaway, supra note 6 at 652.
56.
Makens, supra note 10, notes:
By limiting their review to corporate offerings, Walker and Hadaway
focused on only a small percentage of the offerings filed in and subject to
review by the Texas Securities Board. Although this study concluded that
merit review as a whole is producing its intended result of "equiponderating their positions of the new and existing investors," it is impossible to
reach a general policy determination on the basis of this evidence without
a review of the performance of partnership as well as corporate issues.
!d. at 455 (footnotes omitted).
57.
See Marianne M. Jennings, et. a!, Federalism to An Advantage: The Demise
of State Blue Sky Laws Under the Uniform Securities Act, 19 AKRON L. REV. 395
52.
53.
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response rates on the financial performance survey. 58
The Makens 59 and Mofsky and Tollison60 critiques of the
studies are the only remaining portions of the literature offering critiques on the quantitative analysis of merit review. 61 A
comparison of the factors analyzed and the conclusions in each
of the studies is found in Table I. The present study addresses
the omissions and criticisms of the previous studies.

(1986) wherein the authors, in analyzing holding period returns noted:
Although these results cannot be generalized because of the small
sample sizes for the withdrawn group, these results suggest that the
withdrawn firms did as well financially as the approved group and even
better in year 1.
Id. at 40R.
58.
Makens, supra note 10, stated:
A 1983 study by Kudla and Jennings of Arizona registration process
appears to be an unsuccessful attempt to provide support for a presumption that merit regulation should be abolished. The authors attempted to
compare the performance of issuers of registered and withdrawn offerings
but it is difficult to attach any significance to their conclusions since they
received a very poor response to their questionnaire.
Id. at 456 (footnotes omitted).
59.
Supra note 10.
60.
Supra note 4
61.
The financial literature does include some studies of primary offerings. See,
e.g., Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information
and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. EcoN. REV. 295 (19R9). Additionally
there are some general qualitative analyses regarding the precision and application
of merit regulation. See, e.!J., Hal M. Bateman, State Securities Registration: An
Unresolved Dilemma and a Sufifiestion for the Federal Securities Code, 27 Sw. L. J.
759 (1973); Harold S. Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill,
15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447 (1969); Haughey & Veler, supra note 49, at 689; Rex A.
Hurley & Carla Green, Florida's Response to the Need for Uniformity in Federal
and State Securities Registration Exemption Requirements, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
309 (1984); Mark A. Sargent, The Challenge to Merit Regulation · Part I, 12 SEC.
REG. L.J. 276 (1984); and Richard B. Tyler, More About Blue Sky, 39 WASH. &
LEE 1. REV. 899 (1982).
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS FOR GOODKIND
STUDY AND WALKER AND HADAWAY STUDY
RESEARCH RESULTS OF
Goodkind (1976)

Walker and Hadaway (1981)

Jennings and Kudla (1984)

More than 39 percent of issuers

Less than one percent of all approv-

that were denied registration
could not be located or refused to

als went out of business, as compared with over 18 percent of all

More than 25% of the withdrawn filing issuers could not
be located or did not respond

respond to requests for inform ation as compared to only 14 percent for the registered issuers.

withdrawals.

to requests for information.

Cumulative dividends for the

Approved firms paid higher dividends per share as a percent of offering price.

Holding period returns were
significantly higher in year 1
for those securities withdrawn from the registration
process.

Book value per share was approximately 19 percent higher
after three years for the registered issuers.

Withdrawn firms had a greater
decrease in book value per share as
a percent of offering price.

There were no significant
differences in holding period
returns between withdrawn
and approved firms in years
2, 3, and 4.

Average price after three years
was approximately 28 percent
higher for the registered issuers.

Approved firms had a more than
double increase in price per share as
a percent of offering price three
years subsequent to the offering as
compared to withdrawn firms.

Total assets of withdrawn
firms were smaller.

Market value of the registered
shares in the sample after 3
years had an average gain of
$725,506 per issue while the
value of the shares denied registration had an average Joss of
$2,117,878 per issue.

Cumulative total returns, considering both capital appreciation and
dividends earned, were more than
twice as high for the approved firms
three years subsequent to the offering as compared to the withdrawn
group.

Issuers that were denied registration because of multiple deficiencies had a substantially
poorer performance than the
registered issues.

Withdrawals for multiple merit
standard reafwns had the worst price
performance of any group.

three years expressed as a percentage of the offering price was
higher for the registered group.
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IV. PRESENT DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY

All 1,807 common stock offerings registered with the Arizona Securities Division between 1984 and 1987 were reviewed.62 Limited partnership, bond, and other types of noncommon stock offerings were examined for relative quantity
figures and amounts. 63 For this same period, there were 4,341
non-common stock offerings, with 3,893 being approved and
448 being withdrawn (no denials) with total in-state aggregate
offering amounts (for non-common stock offerings) as depicted
in Table II. The amounts of common stock offerings along with
their approval/withdrawal rates are reflected in Table III. The
number of seasoned offerings are also noted in Table Ill.
Mter obtaining registration information from the Securities
Division files, post-registration financial information was obtained. Approximately 44% of the firms' financial data was
available on the Compustat data base. Where Compustat information was unavailable, individual firm contact was made.

TABLE II
REGULATORY REVIEW OF
NON-COMMON STOCK OFFERINGS
Yean;

Total

Aggregate In-state

Approved

Withdrawn

Offering amotlllt

1984-1987

4341

$135,316,724,755

3893

448

62.
See explanation, infra, page 34.
63.
As noted earlier (see notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text), the lack of
partnership offerings was a criticism of the Walker and Hadaway study. However,
the elimination of them from this study was due to the complexity of comparison
because of factors like the lack of a market place price for comparison, the inability to gather financial data and the inherent heterogeneous nature of offerings other
than common stock. The only meaningful comparison would be whether the firms
were still in business. It is, however, undeniable that a significant portion of capital raised in the state was done through non-common stock offerings and a lack of
review of these offerings leaves unanswered questions.
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF REGULATORY REVIEW OF
COMMON STOCK OFFERINGS
Year

19M1987

TotaJ I
offenogs

1807

Total I
Approved**

1137

TotaJ II
Withdrawn

612

Seasoned
Approved
683

Unseasoned
Approved
464

Withdrawn

Unseasoned
Withdrawn

337

275

Seasoned

Mter attempted contact of the remaining non-Compustat
firms (1013 or 56%), 227 (or 22.4% response rate) provided the
same financial data included in Compustat. Financial data for
1,021 or 56.5% of the offering firms were thus evaluated. Of
the remaining 786 firms, 479 or 61% did not respond and could
no longer be located using either the firm name, names of the
CEOs and four other listed officers of the company or through
contact with attorneys or other experts listed in the registration materials.
While many conclusions could be drawn from the inability
to locate these firms, the most logical one is that the firms are
no longer on-going entities. Of the remaining 786 firms, 307 or
39% (16.9% of the total firm universe) refused to provide data
and 8 did not respond to requests 64 or were excluded due to
factors such as mergers, spin-offs and other corporate structural changes that produced changes in the stocks' character that
made comparison of performance from year-to-year
impossible. 65

64.
The firms did respond to the survey, but they took the position that their
financial figures were proprietary. This was an interesting posture given that the
firms had registered public offerings in Arizona.
65.
For example, several of the firms' outstanding stock was purchased in exchange for shares of another company and they became subsidiaries with the parent holding all shares (no longer traded). There was no continuing data in some
cases; in others there were only consolidated financial statements.
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FINANCIAL COMPARISONS

Three different forms of financial comparisons were run on
the approved vs. the withdrawn group66 of offerings as well as
several subsets of that group. Subsets were created according
to the objections raised by the Securities Division. 67 The three
forms of financial comparison were: growth in earnings per
share (EPS), growth in dividends, and growth in stock price. 68
The growth was computed as the total growth in these three
factors from the time of the offering (for share price) or from
the time of initial EPS or dividend figures (in cases where the
firm had no earnings record or dividends because the offering
was an IP0). 69 The growth figures for the total set of approved vs. withdrawn offerings are found in Tables IV-VI.

66.
In Arizona, as in the Goodkind/Wisconsin study, there were no registration
denials, but both withdrawals and approvals were found. Reasons for withdrawal
included: no explanation; change in firm plans; changes in the market; loss of the
underwriter; withdrawal from Arizona with the offer proceeding in other jurisdictions.
67.
See, pp. 32-34 mfra.
68.
It is important to note that the author is cognitive of the relationship between risk and earnings. The higher the risk associated with an offering, the greater the return on the investment. Simon, supra note 61, at 295 explains:
Consider a security which has a 50 percent chance of being worth
$100 and a fiO percent chance of being worthless. The rational investor
will he willing to pay $fi0 for the issue. (All risk may he diversified). Ex
post, if ex antP expectations are correct 50 percent of the investor's portfolio is worth $0 and 50 percent is worth $100. There are no average
"abnormal" gains or losses. The effects of the investor's uncertainty, however, are reflected in the dispersion of returns. She has earned 100 percent on half of the securities and lost 100 percent on the remaining issues.
The growth was measured after three years. Measuring the results after one
year yielded unsatisfactory results. This is best explained by the fact that IPOs
(particularly newly founded firms) had not been operational long enough to supply
figures at the same time comparisons could be done.
69.
IPO = initial primary offering.
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TABLE IV
APPROVED vs. WITHDRAWN OFFERINGS
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON
DIVIDENDS
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Standard

Mi.mmum

Maximum

F Prob

T

Error

>IT I

Approved

0.56137822

1.99031&41

0.07200708

15.1579

-2.1987

.0202

Withdrawn

2.45510899

11.32170368

0.85829614

81.42999

-4.3450

.0001

Prob

> F' .,

.0001

TABLE V
APPROVED vs. WITHDRAWN OFFERINGS
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON
SHARE PRICE
Mean

Standard

Standard

Deviation

E-rror

Minimum

Maximum

T

F Prob
>IT I

Approved

11.062225

8.28948675

0.29474022

.062

66.00048

2.7001

0.0074

Withdrawn

8.835903

10.2159255

0.77005436

.062

51.0000

3.0808

0.0021

Prob > F' • .0002

TABLE VI
APPROVED vs. WITHDRAWN OFFERINGS
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON
EPS (Fully Diluted)
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Standard

Minimum

M8J[imum

T

Error

F Prob
>IT I

Approved

0.442820992

1.26802

0.4684

-9.309999

10.96099

0.8060

0.4212

Withdrawn

0.32547005

1.80191

.1382

-15.82999

6.75999

1.0059

0.3147

Prob > F' • .0001
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Share price for the two groups shows a near $3 disparity
in- price at the end of three years, and a T-test comparing the
two groups shows the significance of the difference. The withdrawn offerings had a mean figure that was less for earnings
per share, but the T test did not establish significance. The
dividend level of the withdrawn shares is much higher and is
significant. Thus, on a straight across-the-board comparison of
approved vs. withdrawn offerings, the approved offerings performed significantly better with the exception of earnings per
share. However, the presence of the higher level of dividends
can be expected as simply a function of the higher level of risk.
The data was then examined to determine whether other
independent variables produced similar results and hence
could be an explanation for the performances of the approved
offerings. The variable chosen was that of comparing the seasoned offerings with the unseasoned offerings. Tables VII-IX
summarize the comparisons.

TABLE VII
SEASONED vs. UNSEASONED OFFERINGS
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON
DIVIDENDS
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error

Minimum

Maximum

T

F Proh
>IT I

SeQfioned

.66774956

2.2596

0.88832

15.85399

-1.5139

0.1311

Unseasoned

1.45720949

8.7656

.51385

81.42999

-2.1395

0.0327

Prob > F' • .0001
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TABLE VIII
SEASONED vs. UNSEASONED
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON
SHARE PRICE
Mt'IHI

Seab"tJned
Un~;eafilmed

Proh > F"

Standard

Standard

fh•Vlfltwn

Error

Mirumum

Maximum

T

F Prub
>IT I

1n.Han

8.HGHI1

.34158

.062

66.00

1.004

0.3175

~4~4

8.3303~

.48666

.093

46.00

0.9761

0.3293

10

= .Cl'2I57

TABLE IX
SEASONED vs. UNSEASONED
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON
EPS (fully diluted)
Mean

SeaHoned
Unseasoned

l~ob

4242
.4141

Standard
Deviation
1.3216
1.4877

Standard
Error

.05228
.08828

Minimum

Maximum

T

F Prob
>IT I

-9.3099
-15.8299

10.9699

.0959

.9236

6.7599

.1004

.9201

> F':: .0169

Whether an offering is seasoned should affect the dividend
rate. The new offerings should pay a higher dividend, such being a function of the risk associated with the offering. It is important to note in the seasoned vs. unseasoned comparison of
dividends, as well as in the approved vs. withdrawn dividend
comparison, that the high standard deviation for the withdrawn offerings and unseasoned offerings indicates a greater
number of outliers in terms of dividend level.
Share prices for this group are virtually the same and no
significance was found. The resultant share prices for both
groups may be more a function of the market at the time of the
offer and overall market losses in the Dow Jones Index of Industrial Averages during this period.
Surprisingly, earnings per share for the two groups are
similar but not significant. Comparing seasoned and unseasoned offerings with the subset of approved and withdrawn offerings produces the results shown in Table X. With respect to
unseasoned offerings, it is clear that merit regulators are prophetic in determining future market behavior of offerings.
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An examination of the unseasoned offerings demonstrates
that the withdrawn unseasoned offerings will decrease in
share price overall and reach a far lesser price than their approved counterparts. Again, the difference in standard deviations should be noted as indicative of a higher number of outliers in the unseasoned withdrawn categories. Also, the T-test
failed to show significance in the relationship between seasoned offerings and higher share prices.
Interestingly, there is no significant difference between the
seasoned approved and seasoned withdrawn offerings. However, the lack of difference may be explained by the fact that a
larger number of the withdrawn offerings in the seasoned category are withdrawn voluntarily due to market conditions as opposed to withdrawal after regulatory review and objection.

"'"'~-~·'?''1'"1''-''
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TABLE X
SHARE PRICE COMPARISON
THREE YEARS
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TABLE XI
SHARE PRICE COMPARISON
THREE YEARS
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Further refinements in the offering group were necessary
to accurately reflect the level of regulatory input. There are
three types of reviews conducted by the Division. In type one,
the review is limited, approval is achieved quickly and coincides with SEC approval. In this type of review, there were no
withdrawals and a total of 812 files.
In the second type of review, the division's work is more
comprehensive and results in approval only after additional information has been provided, specific questions answered, and
concerns of the division addressed. Figure 1 lists the types of
questions and requests for information found among this second category of registrations. While offerings may be unique,
the questions and requests for information appear to be universal. There were 553 offerings in this category; 195 were
withdrawn and 358 or 64.7% were approved. It is important to
note at this point that the Division's reviews of the proposed
offerings appear to have been handled in a systematic fashion
via forms and checklists that had examiners reviewing offering
files using the same set of standardized criteria. This systematic approach was found to be near universal since 1983 and
markedly different from the review process as it existed in the
earlier Jennings/Kudla study.
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FIGURE 1
CATEGORY 2 REGISTRATION
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
REQUESTS AND QUESTIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Failure to list all commissioners' names·
Failure to provide copy of board resolution for the offering
Failure to provide copy of corporate by-laws
Failure to provide evidence of good standing (for foreign
corporations)
Failure to provide the name of a registered Arizona
broker**
Reasons for withdrawal of a previous proposed offering
Pledge on future loan transactions (pledge to do arms'
length paperwork on all loans to insiders)

*The securities division is a part of the Arizona Corporation Commission, a regulatory body with diverse responsibilities headed by 3 elected commissioners whose names must be
listed on all filings with any division of the commission.
**The division requires that a locally licensed broker be affiliated with the offering.

In the third and final review category, the division expressed grave concerns about the offering. Four hundred sixty
one of the total offerings examined fit into this category; the
end result was withdrawal in 237 or 51.4% of the cases. The
concems expressed in this third category parallel the Division's
regulations; they are listed in Figure 2.
Critical to the evaluation of the regulators' efficacy in the
review process is the subset comparison of Category 3 offerings
with the overall performance of approved offerings. It is in the
Category 3 cases that regulators assume their most aggressive
posture and most clearly state concerns about the proposed offering. These comparisons of Category 3 offerings are found in
Tables XII-XIV. In all three tables the comparisons are between the approved firms and the troubled firms in which
regulators expressed one or more of the 15 concems found in
Figure 2.
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FIGURE 2
THIRD CATEGORY DIVISION
OBJECTIONS TO OFFERINGS
Substantial dilution
Excessive underwriters' compensation
Earnings losses for three years
Unsound financial condition
Conflicts of interest
Losses
Cheap stock
Litigation
Officers' compensation excessive
Loans to related parties
Excessive warrants and options
Excessive offering expense
High risk offering
Promoter or officer under investigation in another state
(sec uri ties)
15. Firm under investigation (includes tax issues (sales & income), and antitrust concerns)

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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TABLE XII
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON OF TROUBLED
OFFERINGS WITH APPROVED OFFERINGS
DIVIDENDS
Standard
Devtatwn

Standard
Error

Minimum

Max1mwn

T

F Prob
>IT I

Approved

0.5613

1.9903

0.0720

15.1579

2.0976

0.0374

Troubled

0.2621

1.2126

0.1231

6.8689

1.4464

0.1484

Prob > F'"" .0001

TABLE XIII
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON OF
TROUBLED OFFERINGS WITH APPROVED OFFERINGS
SHARE PRICE
Mean

Standard

Standard

Deviation

Error

Minimum

Maximum

T

F Prob
>IT I

Approved

11.0622

8.289

.29474

.062

66.000

7.6888

0.0001

Troubled

5.490

G.H53

.6620

.062

35.76

6.4923

0.0001

Prob > F' = .0064

TABLE XIV
THREE-YEAR COMPARISON OF TROUBLED
OFFERINGS WITH APPROVED OFFERINGS
EARNINGS PER SHARE (Fully Diluted)
Mean

Standard
Deviatton

Standard
Error

Mirumum

Ma.xUDum

T

F Prob
>IT I

Approved

0.44282

1.2580

0.04584

-9.3099

10.9699

3.3329

O.OOll

Troubled

0.06278

1.0282

0.1044

-3.5999

5.1699

2.8545

0.0044

Prob > F' •. 0141

l

I

l
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TABLE XV
SUMMARY OF PRESENT STUDY AND COMPARISON
WITH
PREVIOUS WORK
RESEARCH RESULTS OF
Goodkind
(1976)

Walker and Hadaway
(1981)

More than 39 percent of

Less than one percent of all

if:iiUers that were denied
registratJon could not be

approvals went out of buf>l.ness, as compared with over
18 percent of all withdrawals.

located or refused to respond
to request..s for information

as compared to only 14 per·
cent for the registered is&u-

Cumulative dividends for the

Approved firms paid higher

three years expre&:Sed as a
percentage of the offering
price was higher for the

dividends per share as a percent of offering price.

Jenn.ings and
Kudla (1984)

Jennings
(1991)

More than 25% of the
withdrawn filing issuers could not be located

21% of withdrawn filing iEBuers could not be located or
dJd not respond.

or did not respond to
requests for mformation.

Holdmg period returns
were significantly higher in year 1 for those

securities withdrawn
from the registration

registered group.

48.8% of issuers subjected to

intense regulatory review
could not be located or not
not respond.

process.

Book value per share was
approximately 19 percent
higher after three years for
the registered issuers.

Withdrawn fin:ns had a greater decrease in book value per
share as a percent of offering
price.

There were no signifi.
cant differences i.n
holding period returns
between withdrawn and
approved firms in years

66% of withdrawn issuers
could not be located or did
not respond.

2, 3, and 4.

Average price after three
years was approximately 28
percent higher for the registered issuers.

Approved firms had a more
than double increase in price
per share as a percent of
offering price three years
subsequent to the offering as
compared to withdrawn firms.

Total assets of Wlth·
drawn firms were
smaller.

Difference 10 mean figures in
dividends not attributable to
status of approval or withdrawal (appears to be a func·
tion of market perceptiw of
risk).
Share prices for approved
firms are higher at end of the
three-year period (significant)
Earnings per share higher
for approved group but not
attributsble to approved
status.

Market value of the registered shares in the sample
after 3 years had an average
gain of $726,506 per issue
while the value of the shares
denied registration had an
average loSB of$2,117,878

per L&e;ue.
Issuers that were denied
registraQcm because of multi-

ple deficiencies had a sub·
stantially poorer peJformance than the registered
i~~rues.

CumuJat.J.ve total returns,
considering both capital appreciation and dividends
ean1ed, were more than twice

Withdrawals of troubled

as high for the approved

offerings (as deengnated by
regulators) had a share price
less·tllan half of approved
offerings and earnings per

firms three years subsequent
to the offering as compared to
the withdrawn group.

share rnly 20% of approved
offerings with dividends less
than half (not significant).

Withdrawals for multiple
merit standard reasoos had
the worst price performance

of any group.
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Due to risk factors, dividend comparison yields no significant results. However, with only slight differences in standard
deviation, both share price and earnings per share are significantly less for the troubled offerings. The level of significance
is evidence of Arizona regulators' abilities to question correctly
those offerings that prove to be poor performers as compared
with approved offerings. Additionally, 225 or 48.8% of the 461
offerings were in the group which remained unavailable after
two and three-contact efforts. The highest levels of significance
came in this comparison group and demonstrate regulator's
ability to ferret out those offerings most likely to prove costly
to investors.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A summary of the study results is found in Table XV.
Among numerous other conclusions drawn from the study is
one regarding the focus and purpose of merit review. There are
two types of investors: (1) knowledgeable investors (those capable of paying for competent evaluations of securities offerings),
and (2) all other investors. The knowledgeable investor is as
capable as the Division of running standard reviews regarding
earnings records, dilution, underwriters' compensation and
loans to insiders. In fact, except in category 2 and 3 cases
where the Division requests additional information, regulators
have no more information the market has.
On the other hand, there is a second type of investor-the
investor who lacks either the skills necessary to evaluate an offering or the financial means to pay for such an evaluation.
For these investors, regulatory review provides the type of
analysis that they are unable to perform or obtain.
Merit review remains a controversial issue because its role
remains unclear, and critics voice concerns regarding its indirect impact and its costs. Regardless of the outcome of quantitative comparisons and analysis, it is clear that there are significant administrative costs associated with filings. These administrative costs cannot be measured, nor can the effect they
may have in precluding firms from registering offerings. Further, merit review introduces an indirect form of regulation in
that, for example, it serves as a control mechanism for compensation of officers and directors through the direct limitations of
commissions, warrants options and promotional stock.
In many cases, these items are negotiated with regulators
in order to obtain approval and market price controls are thus
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eliminated. Additionally, merit review may present unusual
barriers for smaller firms that cannot qualify for an exemption
and which, as a result, must carry registration costs. Nearly all
merit states offer an exemption for national stock exchange
firms. 70 The stringent exchange requirements preclude most
new firms from meeting an exemption. 71
Many merit states employ a double standard when reviewing new companies as opposed to companies with earnings records. These standards emerge in the forms of stricter registration requirements, 72 impounds, 73 or escrows. 74 This form of
regulation, based on size and lack of earnings, precludes investors from choosing a high-risk, possibly high-return investment. This form of regulation will exclude from the capital
markets those firms with ideas but no capital.
These barriers are costly in terms of innovation, entrepreneurship, and our ability to compete in the international markets. 75 The effect of these price, impound and escrow require70.
See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.402(a)(8) (1990), which exempts securities
listed or approved for listing on the New York, American and Midwest Stock Exchanges. The statute empowered Missouri's administrator to add exchanges and the
Pacific Coast Exchange was later added. Mo. CoDE REGS. tit. 30, § 30-54.060 (1980).

t
t

71.
For example, New York Stock Exchange has the following eligibility requirements: (a) 2,000 holders of 100 shares or more; (b) 1,100,000 shares publicly held;
(c) market value of publicly held shares of at least $18,000,000. The Exchange does
have an alternative method of establishing eligibility-(1) $18,000,000 in net tangible assets; (2) earning power before federal taxes of $2,500,000 in the last year
and $2,000,000 in each of the two years preceding. The Exchange can also impose
additional requirements for trading shares held in one concentrated geographic
area. New York Stock Exchange Equity Products Listed Company Manual Supplement, #2, §§ 101.00-104.00 (1985).
72.
One such restriction is to set the offering price at the price promoters and
other insiders have paid. See, e.g. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 3.02(2)(1984).
73.
Arizona regulators are permitted to impound funds as a condition for registration. The funds are held by a third party but cannot be released without authorization from the administrator (for a maximum of 1 year). See ARIZ. ADM. COMP.
R. & REGS. R14-4-112 (1985) and IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 510-50.31 (502) (1983).
74.
Escrow arrangements permit the administrator to hold the stock of promoters in escrow as a condition of registration. The stock is released when the offeror
establishes a satisfactory earning record for one year and is solvent. See, IOWA
ADMIN. CoDE r. 510.50.37 (1983) and TEX ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3 (5) (1992).
75.
Congress has recognized these peculiar problems of small business financing. In the Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980, the SEC received Congressional authorization "to cooperate with any association composed of
duly constituted representatives of state governments whose primary assignment is
the regulation of securities business within those states" for purposes of "the development of a uniform exemption from registration for small issuers which can be
agreed upon among the several states or between the states and the Federal Government." 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(1) and (c)(3)(c) (1982). Regulation D was the result of
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ments is administrative control of the risk that can be passed
on to the public. For example, a firm with no history of earnings may be forced to accept a price reduction from administrators in order to obtain approval for an offering.
Upon market release of the offering, the market could create a "hot issue" if public perception of the quality of the offering differs from the perceptions of the administrators. 76 The
result is that the offeror clearly could have raised more capital
with the profit from underpricing going to initial investors who
immediately engage in secondary sales. 77 If this be the case,
administrators interfere with efficient market forces. When
this type of interference is characterized as insider trading, it
is considered so unfair as to constitute criminal conduct. 78
The filings, follow-ups and registrations with merit administrators increase the overall offering costs and reduce net capital raised. Although there is a uniform application for state
approval, there are no uniform standards; offerors are forced to
negotiate on a state-by-state basis. 79 Further, the presence of
the generic "fair, just and equitable" standards offers administrators broad discretion80 and many offerings are approved in
some jurisdictions but withdrawn in others. 81 Many administrators base their reviews on years of experience and some critics note there is no indication they are any more able to predict risk. 82

cooperative efforts. See, supra, notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
76.
A "hot issue" is one that sells at a price above the established price for the
offering because public (market) perception is that the issue to worth more.
77.
Bloomenthal, supra note 60, at 1486.
7R.
Federal registration provides for full disclosure--a premise in the efficient
market hypothesis and fully supported by market theorists. Beyond full disclosure,
manipulation and elimination accomplished by merit standards, creates the secondary sales profit noted earlier. See notes 76 & 77, supra, and accompanying text.
Bateman, supra note 61, at 781.
79.
80.
For example Loss and Cowett note: "A mid·Nestern administrator replied
that he looked on uranium issues with a jaundiced eye' and disapproved them
"unless they are of such a nature that we might be tempted to invest our own
money in them." Loss & Cowett, supra note 6, at 77.
81.
Some "merit review" states are simply full disclosure states since merit
standards are not always applied. For example, Maryland is listed as an
antifraud/disclosure state with a "fair, just and equitable" standard but allows
registration by coordination-the state offering is effective upon SEC registration.
See MD. CORPS & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-502, 503 (19R5 & Supp. 1990).
82.
Mofsky states: [State] administrators are no better able than anyone else to
evaluate the riskiness of a given venture. If they were, it is unlikely that they
would be administering the securities law rather than maximizing their wealth in
a more profitable way. James F. Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Law, 2

1

I
I
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It is clear, however, from the Arizona experience, that
when regulators target a particular proposed offering because
of serious or multiple concerns (as listed in Figure 2), their record is nearly perfect. This area of their work is perhaps the
most relevant in an analysis of their efficacy. Because withdrawals are often voluntary, a comparison of approved offerings with withdrawn offerings necessarily groups together offerings that are heterogeneous. A withdrawal may follow a request for information as a means of avoiding administrative
costs and focusing attention on the offering in other states.
However, it is important to note that fully 224, or 48.5% of
these troubled offerings were still eventually approved and 237
or 51.4% of them fell into the category of companies that could
not be located.
One of the more interesting findings of the study is that
dividend rates for the withdrawn and troubled offerings are
higher, a reflection of market perception of higher risk and
hence a mandated higher rate of return. The philosophical
questions remain about the right to earn that higher rate of return and the heterogeneity of investor goals.
The more appropriate question is not whether regulators
are able to screen every offering to maximize investment potential, but whether regulators can actively prevent poor investment decisions regardless of goals. It is clear from their record on multiple problem offerings that Arizona regulators can
help to prevent such poor decisions. The follow-up question is
whether pre-screening is more effective and less costly than
post-offering enforcement action.
While the academic debate may continue, for those who
are saved from a bad investment, the answer is that an effective regulatory system is in place that serves to prevent investor losses. Public gratitude for and perception about that system cannot be underestimated-particularly in those states in
which regulators report directly to elected officials.
An examination of the Arizona review process and its often

FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 80 (1974). See also Robert H. Edwards, California Measures
the Uniform Securities Act Against Its Corporate Securities Law, 15 Bus. L. 814
(1960).

Edwards noted: "The commissioner had established specific little rules that had

to be followed by the deputies, who could not really exercise basic judgement on
the merits of the security as a whole."
ld. at 828.
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too-detailed requests of registrants raises the issue of whether
a high success rate could be achieved if regulators would focus
more on problem offerings and less on crossing "t's" and dotting "i's." Troublesome and time-costly barriers of regulatory
details should not be underestimated. The investigation of substantive questions would likely render a more efficient use of
administrative resources by returning more effective capital
deterrents.

